Agreement under fire: Can the latest SDF-Damascus ceasefire hold?

PARIS — A four-day ceasefire agreement between Syria’s government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) remained in effect on Wednesday despite reported violations by both sides. The understanding, which paused a rapid advance by government forces, marks the latest in a series of efforts to integrate SDF-held parts of northeastern Syria into the central state and sidestep a broader military confrontation. 

The latest SDF-Damascus agreement took effect on Tuesday evening, and came after Kurdish-led forces lost control of Raqqa, Deir e-Zor and parts of Hasakah provinces to the country’s transitional government in the span of less than a week.

Just a day prior, a previous January 18 agreement between Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi collapsed following a ruinous meeting between the two leaders in Damascus. 

The 14-point January 18 agreement included the integration of SDF military and security forces into Syria’s Defense and Interior ministries, as well as the full handover of Deir e-Zor and Raqqa provinces, much of which Damascus had already taken control of before the deal was signed.

The January 20 ceasefire gave the SDF four days to conduct internal consultations and develop a practical mechanism for integration. In the event of an agreement, government forces would not enter the cities of Hasakah or Qamishli, both of which remain under SDF control. Discussion regarding the timing and details for integrating Syria’s northeastern Hasakah province into the state would be postponed.

Additionally, government forces would not enter Kurdish towns and villages, where there would be only “local security forces from the people of the area.” The agreement also stated SDF commander Abdi would nominate an SDF candidate to serve as deputy defense minister, propose a candidate for governor of Hasakah and present lists of people to serve as representatives in parliament and work in state institutions. 

In turn, the SDF announced its full commitment to the January 20 ceasefire and stressed its “openness to political processes, negotiated solutions and dialogue” and readiness to “proceed with implementing the original January 18 agreement.”

The January 20 ceasefire came under US pressure, after Monday’s failed negotiations led to renewed fighting in Hasakah province and calls for a general mobilization from SDF officials considered to be part of what is known as the “Qandil current”: influential figures with ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) headquartered in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq.

Many Syrians have welcomed the new, shaky ceasefire as a way to avoid a major military confrontation, but its success hinges on whether the parties involved can commit themselves to a political process, particularly after the previous agreement lasted only hours.

During Monday’s ill-fated meeting in Damascus, Abdi reportedly attempted to reintroduce previously discussed terms to the January 18 agreement, putting the negotiations back at square one.

On the ground, the SDF has suffered major losses in its areas of control in Raqqa and Deir e-Zor, as well as parts of Hasakah and Aleppo. After controlling roughly a third of Syria, the SDF now retains a large portion of Hasakah province, as well as a pocket surrounding the northeastern Aleppo city of Kobani (Ain al-Arab). 

SDF forces collapsed and withdrew from areas of Raqqa and Deir e-Zor east of the Euphrates River over the course of less than 48 hours, in the wake of internal defections and a series of attacks launched by Arab residents. Government forces subsequently deployed to those areas.

Relations between the Syrian government and SDF began to deteriorate at the start of 2026, after a deadline to implement the March 10, 2025 agreement signed by al-Sharaa and Abdi expired. In early January, Syrian forces seized control of Aleppo city’s predominantly Kurdish Sheikh Maqsoud, Ashrafieh and Bani Zaid neighborhoods, which had been controlled by Kurdish forces since 2015. 

Facing a series of rapid military setbacks, figures within the SDF and its affiliated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) escalated their rhetoric and called for a “general mobilization” in recent days, urging Kurds in Syria and neighboring countries to take up arms and cross borders to confront government forces.

It remains to be seen whether those within the SDF who appear committed to a political settlement—particularly Abdi—are able to implement the terms of any agreement amid escalating rhetoric attributed to the “Qandil current” and shifting events on the ground. 

In the meantime, many residents of northeastern Syria—including both Arabs and Kurds—are living days of uncertainty and fear, watching closely to see whether the newest agreements will hold or collapse, potentially dragging the region into a renewed cycle of fighting and instability.

Swift collapse

Over the course of 10 months following the signing of the March 2025 agreement, Damascus and the SDF made no significant progress towards integrating. Negotiations were at a standstill by the time the two sides began to clash in Aleppo city’s Kurdish neighborhoods earlier this month. With Damascus quickly taking control of Sheikh Maqsoud, Ashrafieh and Bani Zeid, the fighting soon moved to Deir Hafer in the eastern Aleppo countryside, and from there spread into northeastern Syria.

Citing the launching of SDF drones from Deir Hafer, on January 17 the Syrian army declared territory west of the Euphrates River—an area including the Aleppo town of Maskana and parts of Raqqa—a military zone. By the evening of the same day, government forces had taken control of the entire area, as well as the western Raqqa city of Tabqa, and were just across the Euphrates from Raqqa city. Collapses in SDF ranks prompted members of Arab tribes to mobilize and take control of their areas, coinciding with broad defections of Arabs within the SDF and the AANES. 

Facing military losses and SDF forces’ influence shrinking to within Hasakah and the area of Kobani in northeastern Aleppo, Abdi signed the January 18 agreement with al-Sharaa, only to disavow it in Damascus the following day. The new deal, with a weakened SDF, did not represent the culmination of previous months’ negotiating efforts, and was tantamount to the end of the autonomous Rojava project in northern Syria. 

The military and political context of the January 18 and 20 agreements fundamentally differs from that of the March 2025 agreement. Last year, “the SDF was betting on a surplus of military power on the ground and unconditional foreign support, which led them to treat it more as a political maneuvering tool than a strategic commitment,” military and strategic analyst Mustafa al-Farhat told Syria Direct. “They procrastinated and delayed, and did not take steps towards implementing the agreement.” 

By contrast, the January 18 agreement came “amid profound shifts in the balance of power, and a clear decline in the military and political options available to the SDF. Its implementation clauses were more clear, tied to simultaneous steps on the ground rather than general understandings open to interpretation,” al-Farhat added. “The new reality is based on imposing facts on the ground, not reverting to previously postponed agreements.” 

Major areas controlled by the SDF—now composed of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), after the defection of Arab forces—have been reduced to Qamishli, al-Dirbasiyeh, Kobani and Hasakah city, the outskirts of which were reached by government forces on Tuesday before the latest ceasefire went into effect. 

After losing so much territory, “the balance of power changed in a structural, not temporary, way, leaving [the SDF] with an option of what they must do, not what they want to do, because they no longer possess the geographical depth, economic resources or political cover,” al-Farhat said. 

“This does not mean that the SDF is completely incapable of maneuvering, but its options have become limited and it is operating under multiple pressures, most notably popular discontent and the shifting priorities of its backers,” he added.

Fear and panic in Qamishli

In Qamishli, a border city in northern Hasakah long known for its diversity, the events of recent days have created a “state of fear and panic,” Jaber (a pseudonym), an Arab resident, told Syria Direct. Alongside its predominantly Kurdish population, Qamishli is home to Arabs and Assyrian Christians who have lived “for decades without problems or tensions, especially [between] Arabs and Kurds,” he said. 

However, in parallel with Damascus’s takeover of Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo and subsequent fighting between the SDF and government forces, Jaber began to see “signs of hatred from some Kurdish brothers, especially those sympathetic to the PKK, towards us.” What he described as “hate speech and playing on discord” only escalated with the takeover of Raqqa and Deir e-Zor, and the waning of “the ‘brotherhood of peoples’ project of the SDF, which brought only the silencing of voices, forced conscription and marginalization of the Arab component,” in his view.

Jaber was very reluctant to speak to the media, noting “Arabs in the city are remaining silent, afraid of an outbreak of Arab-Kurdish strife that could drag the city into an ethnic conflict with unpredictable consequences,” he said. 

Residents of his neighborhood are staying at home, only going out to “nearby grocery stores and bakeries, while most main markets are closed,” Jaber said. The SDF-affiliated Internal Security Forces (Asayish) have set up checkpoints and deployed patrols on main streets, closely monitoring the movement of pedestrians and vehicles, particularly in Arab neighborhoods, he added. Jaber read this as reflecting a “fear of these neighborhoods revolting and repeating what happened in Raqqa and Deir e-Zor.”

Videos circulating on social media in the past 24 hours appeared to show SDF forces conducting arrests in Hasakah city, prompting Syrian Minister of Defense Murhaf Abu Qasra to issue a statement on Wednesday condemning “arbitrary arrests” he said put the latest ceasefire agreement in jeopardy. 

In recent days, Qamishli’s population has been swelled by the arrival of thousands of families fleeing military operations in other parts of northeastern Syria, said Muhammad Ali (a pseudonym), a Kurdish resident who is volunteering with others in his neighborhood to support the displaced.  

As of January 18, 6,000 people had fled Raqqa for Aleppo and Hasakah, while 7,000 more were en route, according to estimates from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA).

“The city is experiencing very tense and dire conditions. There is a curfew at night, and during the day [Qamishli] is crowded with people,” Ali told Syria Direct. He described an “unbearable” situation, with a “shortage of food and vegetables due to road closures and overcrowding.” 

Qamishli residents like him are gripped by “panic and fear, to the point that we can’t sleep,” he said, adding that “the Kurdish public feels despair and disappointment with the international community.” 

General mobilization and a call to arms

Following the failure of Monday’s meeting between al-Sharaa and Abdi, Fawza Youssef, a member of the Presidential Council of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) who is associated with the “Qandil current,” issued a call on social media for “Kurdistani forces” to declare a general mobilization. “Kurds in Rojava are facing the threat of genocide,” she added, also calling for Kurds in Turkey and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to cross into Syria.

Appeals from Youssef and others found a response among the Kurdish public in Hasakah province, two sources told Syria Direct. “The Kurdish street responded overwhelmingly to the calls for general mobilization, and people went to collect weapons from distribution centers,” said Rumet Afrin (a pseudonym), a Kurdish resident of Qamishli. “Kurds know they must always be prepared for any danger.” 

Originally from the Afrin area of northwestern Aleppo, Rumet was displaced to Qamishli years ago with her family. While many displaced residents have since returned, “it is difficult for me to go back,” she said. “Qamishli is my city, and I will not abandon it. This war is existential for us.” 

“Since [Monday] night, nobody has stayed home. Everyone has taken up arms and gone into the streets to protect their neighborhood. We will not allow [them] to enter our Kurdish areas,” she told Syria Direct. “We believe in negotiated, peaceful solutions, but we are also preparing for war.”

In response to calls for support, a number of Kurdish protesters in Turkey and Iraq have attempted to cross the border into Syria, and some were able to do so. 

“People are responding to calls to mobilize and take up arms only to protect their neighborhoods, as popular defense forces,” Qamishli resident Ali said. “We were all optimistic about the agreements between the government and the SDF, and our side was serious about them, but the government was stalling and we have no trust in it.” 

“Peaceful solutions are always desirable, and we are tired of wars, whether as Kurds or Syrians,” Ali added. “We agree that we must all make concessions for the sake of peace and stability. We hope Kurdish areas will be spared military action.” 

“Each time the Syrian government and SDF reached an agreement, it was welcomed by all in Qamishli, except those with ties to the PKK,” Jaber said. “We, as Arabs in Hasakah, were overjoyed when President al-Sharaa issued Decree 13 [on January 16], restoring the rights of our Kurdish family. We were optimistic about preventing bloodshed, and saw in it a national foundation for citizenship and coexistence.” 

“The city is holding its breath,” he added. “We are worried about the potential for Arab-Kurdish conflict, especially after the PKK armed many of our Kurdish brothers and played on nationalist sentiments.” 

Future of the SDF

Hardliners within the SDF remain capable of disrupting any political agreement, analyst al-Farhat said, as “any solution would exclude them, and they have no interest in that—they would lose the gains they have achieved.” The reported presence of a number of fighters loyal to the former Assad regime within SDF ranks could also present a “disruptive factor for any future solution,” he added.

“The future of any agreement depends on the SDF realizing that the previous phase is over, and that the option of integration is no longer negotiable, but mandatory,” al-Farhat said. “The SDF’s ability to commit is not so much a technical issue as an internal and political one,” as it faces “internal divisions between a pragmatic current that understands the limits of its power and an ideological, interest-driven current that refuses to relinquish its privileges.” 

For its part, “the Syrian state is aware of these complexities, counting on gradual implementation while keeping sovereign pressure tools available,” al-Farhat added. “This means the agreement can and will succeed, but it depends on the SDF abandoning the logic of forced partnership, retaining weapons and factionalism, and moving to the logic of a single state and a single sovereign decision.” 

This report was originally published in Arabic and translated into English by Mateo Nelson.