Can the SDF-Damascus deal withstand internal divisions and geopolitical shifts?

PARIS — With the signing of an agreement between Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) commander Mazloum Abdi on March 10, many Syrians breathed a sigh of relief. The most immediate concerns—a major military confrontation or partition—seemed to have been averted. Still, three weeks later the deal remains fragile and cannot yet be fully relied upon. 

The landmark SDF-Damascus deal stipulated the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the state, including border crossings, the Qamishli Airport and oil and gas fields. 

The agreement’s text stressed the rights of all Syrians to representation and participation in the political process, affirmed Kurds as an integral part of Syria and guaranteed their constitutional rights and citizenship. It also rejected calls for partition, hate speech and any attempts to sow division among components of Syrian society. 

When the agreement was announced, Syrians celebrated it in many cities and on social media. Its timing was important, coming on the heels of days of bloodshed and sectarian violence on the coast that fueled fears of partition. 

But the agreement—set to be implemented by committees by the end of 2025—faces many obstacles. Some stem from internal and structural factors, while others arise from the interests of countries involved in Syria, leaving the agreement vulnerable to geopolitical shifts. 

How is the SDF-Damascus deal being implemented? What internal challenges does it face, particularly from varying stances within the SDF and its civilian wing, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES)?

Where does the deal stand?

Three weeks on, no noticeable progress has been made towards implementing the provisions of the SDF-Damascus agreement. A number of decisions and measures taken by the SDF and the AANES appear to indicate they are operating independently of the capital—the status quo before the agreement was signed. 

On March 26, a leader in the AANES denied reports that oil wells had been handed over to the Damascus government. “Work is still underway to form the committees tasked with negotiating with Damascus,” the unnamed source told North Press. Syrian media had reported that Damascus was preparing to receive oil installations controlled by the SDF-backed administration.

Days earlier, the AANES issued a decision cancelling all previous instructions related to the export of agricultural crops and requiring official approval for the export of strategic crops. Under Decision No. 79, wheat, barley, cotton and corn cannot be exported without prior approval from the AANES. 

On a military level, the SDF continues operations to dig military tunnels and construct underground headquarters and ammunition depots in its areas of influence in northeastern Syria, according to local media. This indicates the SDF is acting militarily in isolation from the Syrian Ministry of Defense, under which other military factions have been integrated, with the SDF expected to follow. 

The digging operations coincide with limited military confrontations between the SDF and former Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) factions. On March 19, the SDF published statistics from its military operations in eastern Aleppo, saying SDF forces targeted Turkish forces and factions loyal to them—referring to former SNA forces now under the defense ministry—in response to Turkish targeting of SDF-controlled villages near the Tishreen Dam.

The agreement signed by al-Sharaa and Abdi has not succeeded in quieting the fronts so far, despite a ceasefire being among its provisions. Damascus has remained silent, making no statements on military developments in northern Syria. 

“The terms that were reached were discussed between Damascus and Hasakah in three meetings, and committees emerged from the discussions that will begin their tasks in early April,” said Mahmoud Habib, the spokesperson for the SDF’s Northern Democratic Brigade, commenting on the agreement and its implementation. The first committee to be formed, “affiliated with the Ministry of Oil, visited oil fields and installations to make a comprehensive study and evaluate the fields to maximize production,” Habib said. 

Government institutions in northeastern Syria remain under the AANES umbrella so far, including regarding the payment of employee salaries, Habib added. “This issue has not been settled,” he said, because “transferring responsibility for salaries to Damascus requires an understanding between the new administration and the SDF.” 

SDF chief Abdi met on March 19 with a committee formed by al-Sharaa to finalize the agreement. The two sides discussed the working mechanisms for the implementation committees, which will start joint work in April. 

Will the deal succeed? 

Public statements by the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC)—the political wing of the SDF—and Ilham Ahmed, the co-chair of the AANES Foreign Affairs Department, reflect a different stance from that of Abdi, the SDF commander who signed the agreement with Damascus. 

While the SDC gave its blessing to the agreement, its statement on it focused on “decentralization.” This is a main sticking point between Damascus and Hasakah, and was not mentioned in the terms of the March 10 deal. 

When discussing internal differences in northeastern Syria or the existence of different currents within the SDF, accusations emerge regarding ties to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey. The jailed leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, called for the group to dissolve and lay down its arms in February. 

A number of PKK leaders hold high-ranking positions in the AANES. They are often referred to as the “Qandil current” for the Qandil Mountains, the PKK’s headquarters in northern Iraq. 

“The PKK’s policy and stance towards Turkey and residents northeast of the Euphrates [River]” is one of the main obstacles facing the agreement, Samer al-Ahmad, a journalist from Qamishli who currently lives in France, said. 

While negotiations between Damascus and the AANES continue, “the PKK” and its figures in “the SDF” are “directing demonstrations against the constitutional declaration and conducting arrests on various charges related to raising the revolution flag or pictures of Ahmad al-Sharaa, among others,” al-Ahmad said. 

In his view, PKK influence and policy poses a “serious security obstacle to the agreement, and represents the extensions of the party and its political backgrounds, whether related to Iran, Israel or others, seeking primarily to sabotage the agreement.” 

However, Habib denied there are any such currents within the SDF. He said what has been published to this end is a “malicious narrative—the SDF is a disciplined military force with a unified command…and a single vision, expressed by General Mazloum Abdi.” 

The ultimate success of the SDF-Damascus agreement hinges on both internal conditions—independent decision-making—and external factors related to international influence in Syria, defected Brigadier General Mustafa al-Farhat, a political and strategic analyst, told Syria Direct. While Damascus can make a sovereign decision, “the SDF, which is dominated by the American decision, cannot,” he said. 

“The leadership in Damascus has the ability and desire to advance the agreement, since it fulfills its demands of reuniting the large Syrian family and ensuring the success of its rule. It has the ability to achieve internal and external balances,” al-Farhat said. For the SDF, “these conditions are not available” to the same degree. 

Al-Farhat pointed to “currents within the SDF: one that wants to return to the nation and pursue a national project, led by Mazloum Abdi, and another that represents a cross-border militia with a non-national agenda, led by Qandil cadres and the PKK.” This division “poses a major challenge to the agreement,” he said. 

Looking internationally, al-Farhat’s reading is that Turkey “is not reassured by the agreement and fears the Qandil elements in the SDF, who will strive to collapse the agreement, refuse to hand over weapons and push to establish a separate state or canton.” 

The United States (US), meanwhile—a key backer of the SDF—“considers the east of the Euphrates to be an American protectorate. President Trump is an economic man who tries to resolve wars and find ways out of them, including in Syria,” he added. 

The US is playing a direct role in seeing the agreement through, al-Farhat said, citing a recent meeting between Damascus and the SDF at an American base in Hasakah. This points to “Washington’s direct sponsorship of the agreement, and that it wants it to succeed,” he said. 

Despite the contentions and circumstances surrounding the implementation of the agreement, al-Farhat is optimistic that it will eventually succeed. That is, unless “Trump backs down from what he intended, which happened before” in the case of his announced withdrawal from Syria in 2019. 

For journalist al-Ahmad, the deal’s success “depends on the desire of Turkey and the US on one hand, and on Mazloum Abdi having the ability and strength to implement it separately from the currents trying to spoil it” on the other. He agreed that “Washington and the Erbil government are working for the success of the agreement,” while Ankara’s stance is “unclear” with “red lines related to the PKK and its commanders.” 

“Iran, which is working to sabotage the agreement, should not be overlooked,” al-Ahmad added, contending Tehran has “relationships with Qandil leaders.” The success of the deal would “not be in the interest of Iran, which does not want stability in Syria.” 

An official from one civil society organization in eastern Syria described the agreement as “fragile,” and “more international than Syrian, tied to the desires of international powers—foremost among them the US—to make it a success and oblige local actors,” he said. 

The official, who asked not to be identified for security reasons, accused the SDF of “moving towards escalation or procrastination, hoping the international situation will change.”

Habib disagreed. “The continuing attacks by Turkey and SNA factions along the lines of contact threaten security and safety east of the Euphrates—they are what is hindering the progress of the agreement,” he said. “External interference in determining and formulating the Damascus government’s policies must be stopped, and regional axes should be kept out of Syrian affairs so that Syrians can reach the understandings needed to advance more quickly.” 

“We must hasten the drafting of a constitution leading to a transitional government that includes all segments of society, with popular and international acceptance, to legitimize the management of state institutions,” Habib added. 

The spokesperson denied any backtracking on the SDF-Damascus agreement, stressing that work on it “continues at a steady pace, with no fears of its stopping or obstruction.” Officially, the SDF, AANES and SDC “are in agreement on dialogue with Damascus,” he added. 

He revealed efforts “by governments to help reach understandings that please everyone, foremost among them the US.”

Does the agreement represent everyone?

On the ground, four civilians Syria Direct spoke to in Raqqa, Deir e-Zor and Hasakah had not noticed any clear change since the signing of the agreement. 

“Raqqa’s people view the deal as a military agreement between two sides,” Salem al-Hamad (a pseudonym) said from Raqqa city. “Raqqa has been marginalized, with no regard for the opinion and views of its residents, most of whom support the Syrian revolution and paid a price for this stance.” 

Two sources from Raqqa said the SDF has not opened any direct dialogue with residents regarding the agreement with Damascus. They felt it “disregarded” residents’ aspirations and “right of self-determination,” especially for Arabs. What meetings did occur were with “figures from Raqqa who do not represent the city, and work with AANES institutions,” al-Hamad said. 

On March 7, Mazloum Abdi met with clan notables and sheikhs in Raqqa and Tabqa. The meeting, attended by the US-led international coalition, discussed developments in Syria, including “dialogue with Damascus.” 

Abdi promised at the meeting that a “delegation would be formed, made up of people from all the area’s components, for dialogue with Damascus on the area’s future and the Syrian state,” North Press reported at the time. 

“Kurds are upset by the agreement because it provided nothing regarding Kurdish rights, and amounts to a concession in the struggle for Kurdish rights,” the civil society source said. Meanwhile, “the Arab component is also upset at being marginalized, because they believe Mazloum Abdi is negotiating over the fate of the SDF and Kurdish interests with no regard for Arab rights.” 

Recent arrest campaigns by the SDF in areas it controls have increased discontent and raised doubt towards its stance on the agreement. 

Those arrested included people opposed to SDF policy, including supporters of Syria’s new government and those who participated in events commemorating the anniversary of the 2011 revolution in mid-March, a number of activists from northeastern Syria said in a joint statement. 

SDF arrests increased “significantly in Raqqa in the wake of celebrations of the victory and anniversary of the Syrian revolution,” al-Hamad said. AANES security services “summon anyone who appears in pictures and videos celebrating the revolution,” he added. 

The Revolutionary Youth (Ciwanên Şoreşger) also attacked celebrations and demonstrations in the city, he added. “Unfortunately, we cannot organize any national events in Raqqa, as they could turn bloody due to confrontations between SDF supporters and those celebrating.” 

For his part, Habib said reports of arrests were “untrue, and aim to disrupt the atmosphere of understanding between Damascus and the east of the Euphrates.” Celebrations this month “took place with the protection of the security forces, and no arrests or intimidation occurred,” he said.  

This report was originally published in Arabic and translated into English by Mateo Nelson.