Damascus and the AANES: Complex negotiations at a pivotal moment

HASAKAH/PARIS — A round of negotiations set to get underway on Friday between Syria’s transitional government and a delegation from the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) was delayed due to the arrival of the United States (US) special envoy for Syria to the capital on Thursday. 

The talks aimed to discuss the implementation of a landmark agreement, signed by Syria’s interim President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leader Mazloum Abdi in March, to integrate all northeastern Syrian institutions into the state. A new date for the negotiations has not been set, a journalist close to the AANES delegation told Syria Direct.

Ahead of the meeting, the internal affairs on the northeastern Syrian side were in disarray, with two delegations aiming to negotiate with Damascus: one representing the AANES, and a Kurdish unity delegation focused on Kurdish issues. Damascus, meanwhile, remained firm in its position rejecting any discussion of decentralization. 

The international community—particularly Turkey and the US—are closely watching the negotiations, which aim to move towards implementing the March 10 agreement and integrating SDF-affiliated security and military institutions into the Damascus government. 

On Thursday, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stressed the need to implement the SDF-Damascus agreement within the planned time frame, accusing the SDF of using “stalling tactics.”

In a pivotal moment for relations between Damascus and northeastern Syria, what is at the heart of the latest negotiations? What are the obstacles to reaching consensus, what internal and external factors are playing a role, and what do people in northeastern Syria make of it all?

Two delegations

The signing of the March 10 agreement between al-Sharaa and Abdi was a pivotal moment for Syria, coming in the wake of days of bloodshed and sectarian violence on the coast that fueled fears the country could come apart. The deal also appeared to stave off the possibility of a military resolution to disagreements between Damascus and the largest nonaffiliated military entity in the country. 

The agreement also laid the foundation for a separate deal between the two sides in Aleppo city’s Kurdish-majority Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods that saw mutual prisoner releases at the start of April. The Aleppo agreement was largely seen as a litmus test for the success of a broader agreement in northeastern Syria. 

However, many obstacles remain. Some are internal, including the differing positions of SDF leaders and the AANES towards the agreement. Others involve the interests of countries, like Turkey, that are deeply involved in Syria, leaving the deal vulnerable to geopolitical shifts in the region. 

Read more: Can the SDF-Damascus deal withstand internal divisions and geopolitical shifts?

The SDF-Damascus agreement stipulated the integration of all civil and military institutions in northeastern Syria into the state, including border crossings, the Qamishli Airport and oil and gas fields. 

The text of the agreement also stressed the rights of all Syrians to representation and participation in the political process, affirmed Kurds as an integral part of Syria and guaranteed their constitutional rights and citizenship. It also rejected calls for partition, hate speech and any attempts to sow division among components of Syrian society.

However, the agreement did not directly address Kurdish rights, which angered many Kurdish political parties who felt unrepresented. In response, the AANES—the civilian wing of the SDF—held a Kurdish-Kurdish dialogue conference at the end of April. The conference produced a joint political vision expressing Kurdish demands, as well as the formation of a joint delegation to negotiate with Damascus on Kurdish rights. 

“The SDF delegation is the March 10 agreement delegation, but the Kurdish delegation is problematic,” researcher Samer al-Ahmad said. “How will Damascus legally deal with it, on what basis, and what will it demand,” he wondered. “Kurdish rights are constitutional rights, and discussing them requires there be a constitutional council or parliament, which is not possible in the interim period. Not to mention that the current government does not have the constitutional representative capacity to grant constitutional rights.” 

Akid Mishmish, the editor-in-chief of North Press, a news agency in northeastern Syria that is close to the AANES, also had questions about what role the Kurdish delegation would play. “Will this delegation negotiate Kurdish rights separately, or will it join the AANES delegation? So far, there is really no answer to this sensitive question,” he told Syria Direct. 

Fawza Youssef (far right), a member of the presidential body of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), Mazloum Abdi (third from left), commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Hamid Darbandi (center), a representative of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), attend a Kurdish unity conference in Qamishli, northeastern Syria, 26/5/2025 (Sozdar Muhammad/Syria Direct)

Journalist and political analyst Abdulhalim Suleiman described multiple delegations as a “negotiating tactic.” The existence of a delegation focused primarily on Kurdish rights is necessary, he said, “because the al-Sharaa-Abdi agreement did not deal with the Kurdish issue clearly and in detail, but rather referred to ensuring Kurds’ rights in the constitutional declaration.” 

The AANES and Kurdish delegations “intersect on some issues and files, and differ on others,” Suleiman added. “The Kurdish delegation represents the Kurdish vision for the form of the state, and how to resolve the Kurdish issue. The AANES delegation is more technical,” so “each has different tasks,” he said. 

Qamishli-based civil activist Avin Youssef agreed that having two “delegations does not negatively impact negotiations, since each issue has different complexities and calculations,” she said. “This should not be seen as being scattered, especially given the coordination between the two, and that the two delegations’ demands are not in conflict.” 

Faltering negotiations

The March 10 agreement set a deadline for negotiating committees to implement its terms by the end of the year. This deadline has not passed, but so far “there is no notable progress on the ground, especially on thorny issues like protecting [Islamic State] IS prisons, integrating the SDF into the Ministry of Defense, managing oil wells and the form of the relationship between the two sides,” Mishmish said. 

Al-Ahmad described the course of negotiations as “faltering,” and accused the SDF of “stalling implementation of the agreement.” At the same time, “procrastinating and buying time is not in their interest, especially with the opening of Syrian-American relations, President al-Sharaa meeting with US President Trump” and the lifting of sanctions, he said. 

The US president announced his country would remove all sanctions on Syria on May 13, at the start of a four-day visit to the Middle East. He met with al-Sharaa in Saudi Arabia the following day.

Washington wants to “resolve the issue of the al-Hol [detention] camp and the prisons in SDF areas, and pressures the latter to turn these files over to the Syrian government,” in which case the SDF would lose a “strong bargaining chip,” al-Ahmad said. “The content of the [SDF-Damscus] agreement stipulates the integration of institutions and military forces, which means the end of the SDF. It does not want that, so is trying to impose a decentralized solution,” he added. 

The future form of Syria’s government and the details of how SDF forces will be integrated into the Ministry of Defense are among the most contentious points between Damascus and Qamishli. The AANES insists on a decentralized system, which Damascus strongly rejects. 

The SDF insists on being “part of the Syrian army as a formation, not as individuals,” one SDF military commander told Syria Direct. “The dissolution of our forces is not acceptable, because it will endanger security east of the Euphrates and in all of Syria. The danger is IS activity.” 

“We have prisons holding IS members that need a large guard and surveillance force,” the commander added, speaking on condition of anonymity. “There is also the matter of securing major cities and towns by supporting the security forces if requested, keeping in mind that IS cells could activate there. Let us not forget the ongoing cooperation with the international coalition forces to combat terrorism, which the SDF is part of.” 

Over the past years, northeastern Syria experienced a reality of “state decentralization, and this vision developed in the absence of Assad regime control over the area,” journalist Suleiman said. “The region conducted its affairs apart from Damascus, and achieved many security, military and economic gains independent of the central government,” he added. 

“The new government’s quest to unify the state under the central authority of Damascus clashes with many of the ideas that emerged during the years of the Syrian revolution, produced by the disintegration of the [central] state structure and the distribution of regions between various military factions,” Suleiman explained. 

“Reaching consensus solutions is a necessity,” he added, warning that “insisting on a centralized state could push things towards internal conflict, tearing Syrian territory apart and losing the chance to unite the sides under a new political vision.” 

In response, the SDF commander ruled out “the scenario of war or confrontation with Damascus, since the climate is positive so far.” He also refuted reports in local media of SDF forces mobilizing in their areas. 

As researcher al-Ahmad sees it, “the SDF wants the Iraqi Kurdistan model—maintaining its military, political and administrative institutions and obtaining positions in the state in exchange for nominal subordination to Damascus,” he said. This option “is neither possible nor appropriate at the moment. Syria is not Iraq, and the demographic makeup of Syria’s [northeastern] Jazira region is different: not everyone is Kurdish or SDF supporters,” he added. 

The upcoming negotiations with Damascus “will primarily discuss the shape of the relationship between Damascus and Qamishli,” North Press editor Mishmish said. “Is it decentralization, federalism, autonomy, or just broad powers for mayors and [local] councils?”  

As for the question of the SDF merging with the Ministry of Defense as individuals, “that is a red line that the AANES will not negotiate,” Mishmish added. “The fate of the SDF is the most complicated [issue], because dismantling it would strip northeastern Syria’s leverage.” 

“As for the other matters, such as the form of the government and recognition of the Kurdish language, I believe they are arrangements that will ultimately lead to mutual understandings between the two sides,” he said. 

Read more: After years of revival, what is the Kurdish language’s future in Syria?

Is the AANES delegation representative? 

The AANES delegation includes members representing the communities that make up Syria’s northeastern Jazira region: Kurds, Arabs and Syriacs. “It represents the ethnic and religious diversity of northern Syria and seeks to negotiate as a whole, not as separate entities like Kurds, Arabs and Christians,” Mishmish said. 

Although the delegation took the ethnic, religious and geographical diversity of AANES territories into account, it is “a delegation that minimally represents civil society in the region,” journalist Suleiman said. 

“The delegation does not represent the people of Deir e-Zor or the Arab component,” one media activist from the northern Deir e-Zor countryside told Syria Direct on condition of anonymity for safety reasons.” The Arab members of the delegation are affiliated with the AANES or SDF, and do not represent civilians’ demands.” 

While the AANES negotiates for federal rule or decentralization, the activist said “people in Deir e-Zor reject decentralized rule under SDF control, because that means a continuation of the marginalization they have experienced for years.” 

A Christian cleric living in Qamishli said his community “views the Syrian Jazira region as a wonderful mosaic,” but “there is no peace, no security, no stability, no coexistence [in the northeast] without an agreement with Damascus.” 

“We, as a Christian church community, have not been affiliated with any faction or party,” he added, also requesting anonymity for safety reasons. He did not object to decentralization, but “it must be in agreement with Damascus, because without it we will not be able to live in peace, and will remain in conflict with the neighbors [Turkey].”

The cleric added the AANES negotiating delegation does not represent everyone. Sanharib Barsom, a member of the delegation representing Syriacs, “represents his party [the Syriac Union Party] only, and does not represent the large majority of Christians,” he said. 

He called for the AANES to accept the return of state institutions to northeastern Syria. “Citizens only have confidence in Damascus as a reference for proof of ownership and educational documents,” he said. “In all countries of the world, political parties do not have weapons, but only pen and paper, and engage solely in politics.” 

Researcher al-Ahmad warned of “society exploding in the SDF’s face if it keeps procrastinating negotiations with Damascus,” noting “the public in Jazira is living under intense security, economic and political pressure.” 

Al-Ahmad and the activist from Deir e-Zor accused the SDF of bringing in military reinforcements from other parts of Syria and abroad to boost security against such a backlash, which Syria Direct could not independently verify. 

Future of negotiations

Negotiations between Damascus and the AANES could be “long and complicated, resulting in the formation of subcommittees and many rounds [of talks] before reaching understandings,” Mishmish said. “It is too early to judge the success or failure of this path.” 

While other sources downplayed the strength of the AANES at the negotiating table, Mishmish had a different reading. 

“The AANES has points of strength: the international momentum from years of fighting IS, its administrative organization and the unified decision of military forces under the SDF, not to mention control of Syria’s breadbasket and a large reservoir of oil reserves,” he said. “All this puts the delegation in a strong position.” 

Damascus and Qamishli both understand “the importance of reaching solutions, and that negotiation is a strategic process,” Suleiman said. He ruled out the scenario of armed confrontation or escalation, saying current tensions are “pressure and negotiating tactics.” 

“The outcomes depend on the flexibility of the guarantors and parties involved in Syrian affairs, such as Turkey, which is trying to control the Damascus government’s decisions in various ways,” activist Youssef said. She noted that negotiations are not likely to achieve immediate results on the ground, and that many meetings may be required. 

This report was originally published in Arabic and translated into English by Mateo Nelson.