Hezbollah and Iran-backed militias reposition in Syria
Their positions exposed, Hezbollah and Iranian-backed militias are repositioning themselves in Syria to avoid being targeted, while Russia uses its own forces as a counterbalance.
8 November 2024
PARIS — Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran-linked militias are repositioning within Syria in an effort to minimize their exposure as Israel strikes continue following the killing of top commanders.
Recent movements in Syria aim to “shore up the security breach, following the exposure of the positions of Hezbollah and Iran-linked militias,” military and strategic analyst Brigadier General Mustafa al-Farhat said.
In the wake of Tel Aviv’s military operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, launched in September—including the assassination of its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah—the group has discovered “not only is it exposed in terms of surveilling commanders, but also military positions,” al-Farhat added. “It has a problem at the geographical level.”
In the face of what al-Farhat described as Hezbollah’s collapse and the elimination of its commanders, “leadership transferred to Iran, which took over decisions of defense, attack and repositioning” in Syria, he contended.
While Iranian-linked forces reposition in Syria, Russian forces are making moves of their own, extending their presence on the border with the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights as well as eastern Syria—a militia stronghold.
Iranian-driven repositioning
On October 29, Israeli warplanes struck military sites in the western Daraa countryside Tal al-Jabiya area. At the same time, Israeli artillery targeted the Tal al-Faras, al-Rafid, al-Maalaqa, al-Hiran and Koudna areas of the Quneitra countryside, near the occupied Golan Heights.
Tel Aviv’s strikes indicate “the possible presence of activity” by Hezbollah or Iranian-backed militias that the regime has not restricted or prevented in western Daraa and Quneitra, one former opposition military commander based in northern Daraa said. He expected the late October strikes came after “Iranian militias and Hezbollah made several moves, changing positions in Syrian army barracks over the previous two weeks.”
In eastern Syria, near the border with Iraq, new Hezbollah forces appeared in Deir e-Zor province, local opposition media organization Deir e-Zor 24 reported. At the same time, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command in the city of al-Mayadeen ordered all its members to undergo mandatory military training in machine guns, heavy weapons and armored vehicles.
Earlier in October, Iranian militias evacuated their headquarters in the Syrian-Iraqi border area around the eastern Deir e-Zor city of al-Bukamal in an effort to avoid Israeli and United States (US)-led international coalition strikes.
As part of movements in Deir e-Zor, “Yemeni experts arrived in al-Bukamal,” Omar Abu Layla, the director of Deir e-Zor 24, told Syria Direct. Iranian-backed militias “are intensifying their presence in northeastern Syria after the Israeli strikes” against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, he added.
As Tehran’s militias increase their presence in the east, they are “changing some of their [weapons] stores and positions, fearing they will be bombed by the coalition and Israel in Iraq and Syria, as happened in Lebanon,” Abu Layla said.
Border areas between Lebanon and Syria’s central Homs countryside and eastern Qalamoun—among the main sites where Hezbollah is deployed in the country—have also seen redeployment and position changes. In response, on October 31 the Israeli military targeted the headquarters of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force in the city of al-Qusayr, near the border.
Despite Tel Aviv’s strikes, “Hezbollah does not dispense with any area in Syria, because Syria is a supply route for it,” Firas Fahham, a researcher at the London-based Dimensions for Strategic Studies (DSS) institute, said. Still, in some areas, as in the south, “it tries to hide within Syrian regime formations such as the Golan Regiment and 4th Division” or “repositions from time to time, so as not to be an easy target.”
Neither Hezbollah nor the regime, “mere tools to realize the Iranian project,” has the final say in these moves, al-Farhat argued. Tehran has moved its fight with Israel to the land of its opponents, in his view, confronting Tel Aviv “using the same opponent, as it is now fighting with the Arab element, including Yemenis and Afghans.”
While the West and Israel pressure Damascus to “remove Iranian militias and prevent them from using the Syrian front,” it “cannot force Tehran to leave its territory,” al-Farhat said.
Beyond that, Iran has “soft tools” within Syrian regime institutions and society that enable it to “protect its security and military interests in Syria,” Nawar Shaaban, a researcher at the Istanbul-based Harmoon Center for Contemporary Studies, said. Iran and Hezbollah have been building this strategy since 2018, he added.
Iran’s penetration in Syria “makes it difficult to put pressure on Tehran,” given the range of tools “it can use against the regime to tighten the noose” if it attempted to do so, Shaaban added.
Changes to the positions of Hezbollah and Iran-backed militias will not end in “withdrawal” because “the militias on the border with the Golan are a pressure card against Israel” that Iran cannot lose, al-Farhat said. added. “Just as Iran knows how to weave carpets well, it is weaving the positioning of its militias” similarly, he added.
Russia sits on the fence
While Hezbollah and Iran-backed militias reposition in Syria, Russian forces deploy more troops in eastern and southern Syria. In late October, Russian reinforcements—missiles, armored vehicles and soldiers—were sent to two of Moscow’s bases in the Deir e-Zor countryside.
In southern Syria, Moscow’s forces periodically patrol the western Daraa countryside and Quneitra, and have doubled their observation points in the area since November 2023 in the wake of Hamas’ al-Aqsa Flood operation against Israel.
In October alone, Russian forces established three new observation points in the Quneitra countryside, bringing their number of positions on the border with the Golan Heights to 18. These actions indicate that Moscow does not want confrontations with Israel to expand within Syrian territory.
Moscow is trying to “sit on the fence,” Fahham said. “It does not hinder Israeli strikes and does not stop Iranian movements, but rather manages them,” he added. “Russia is facing delicate balances related to its conflict with the West, and has an alliance with Iran.”
This approach is evident in Russia’s stance, as “at times Moscow provides cover for Iranian movement to pressure Israel, while at other times it responds to Israeli requests and does not hinder its strikes,” Fahham said.
Al-Farhat thinks it unlikely for Moscow to offer cover or protection to Iranian militias in Syria, however. “While there is a mutual interest between Moscow and Tehran, and an exchange of services, Russia hopes for Iran to get out of Syria,” he said, feeling “it reaped less than Iran did in Syria, despite the political and military cover.”
“If it wanted to protect Iran’s militias, it would have activated the S-300 and S-400 air defense systems,” he added.
This report was originally published in Arabic and translated into English by Mateo Nelson.