Is there a road forward for Suwayda’s Druze and Damascus?

MARSEILLE/PARIS—In early March, Suwayda city’s al-Karama (Dignity) Square was filled with optimism as demonstrators chanted in support of Syrian unity: “One, one, one, the Syrian people are one.” The gathering came in the aftermath of a landmark deal between the interim government and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—an agreement the demonstrators hoped would pave the way for a similar understanding with Druze factions in Suwayda.

Four months later, these voices have fallen silent, after nearly two weeks of bloodshed claimed at least 814 lives in the southern province. “We regret to say the Syrian people are not one, Syrian blood is not one,” activist Abeer al-Qontar (a pseudonym), 52, who is Druze, told Syria Direct. “We’ve reached the point of no return,” she added. “I can’t imagine we could still live together.” Al-Qontar was one of the organizers of Suwayda’s over year-long anti-Assad protest movement, known locally as the hirak, and participated in the March demonstration.

On July 14, government forces deployed to Suwayda province in what Damascus said was an effort to quell clashes that broke out the day before between local Druze and Bedouins. Many residents perceived the move as an attempt to forcibly bring the province under its control. 

Far from bringing security, the intervention touched off new fighting, as local Druze forces battled government forces and allied armed forces, including tribal Bedouin fighters. During heavy clashes in Suwayda city and beyond, Damascus-aligned forces carried out sectarian killings of Druze civilians. 

Israel intervened, bombing government forces and the Syrian Ministry of Defense, forcing a withdrawal. When government forces pulled out, they left a trail of destruction: burned and looted homes, and bodies in the streets. Druze forces immediately retaliated with a new wave of sectarian attacks, killing and displacing Bedouin civilians and burning their homes. Tribal forces from around Syria mobilized in response, flowing into Suwayda unimpeded for a new round of fighting. 

A ceasefire ordered by Damascus on July 19 and agreed to by Druze and Bedouin actors has since restored a fragile calm in southern Syria, despite multiple breaches. Government forces are preventing tribal fighters from reentering Suwayda and hundreds of Bedouins have been evacuated to neighboring provinces.

Within Suwayda, Druze activists who called for unity four months ago are now among those reeling and grieving, grappling with the seeming unraveling of what they hoped would be possible in a post-Assad Syria. Has a point of no return been reached, or is there a narrow road forward? What could Damascus do to repair shattered ties with the Druze community? 

Initial openness towards Damascus

Like al-Qontar, Sara Ezzedin (a pseudonym), 35—a feminist activist who works with civil society organizations in Suwayda—was once part of the small but outspoken minority in the province in favor of giving Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa’s new government a chance. 

“I was really open to cooperating with the interim government because of all the promises they made to the Syrian people that they will fulfill all of the revolution’s goals—and that we have the same experience and history of violence from the [Assad] regime,” she said.

“We believed that the political transition was the only solution, so we tried to cooperate by all means, through our activities as civil society, through meetings with decision makers. I personally didn’t hesitate to give my experience to members of the government,” she added.

Al-Qontar had high hopes the new government would pursue a political solution, rather than a military one, to unify the country. “We knew that he [al-Sharaa] was a terrorist, his background with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State…all of Syria knows, but despite this we said he might have taken a nationalistic path…or that there was an international position to transform Syria into a democratic country, as its people deserve,” she said. 

Al-Sharaa’s formally dissolved faction, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), was until 2016 Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate under its previous iteration, Jabhat al-Nusra. Up until 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra had ties to the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), the precursor of IS.

Khaled Mazhar (a pseudonym), 46, a fellow member of the hirak, was approached to work for the new administration. “I had very, very big hope for the unity of Syria,” he said. “My position towards the transitional government was good because they were part of the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad and it was clear that they wanted to do something beautiful in the country,” he added. But “their actions were not their words.”

Both al-Qontar and Mazhar say their position towards Damascus started to change gradually as the transitional government began taking shape. “Little by little, things began to reveal themselves and the stance became clear to us, like the coastal massacres [in March], then the constitutional declaration…the consolidation of dictatorship,” al-Qontar said.  

The constitutional declaration, essentially a draft constitution to govern the country during the course of its post-Assad political transition, was approved by al-Sharaa mid-March. Syrian and international organizations have raised concerns that the document concentrates presidential power and undermines judicial independence. 

“My position changed gradually, not during the events in Suwayda, but now with the latest events it’s become a divorce,” Mazhar said. “What they did in Suwayda, IS didn’t [even] do…they entered and killed people in their homes and burned their homes.” In 2018, IS infiltrated Suwayda, killed more than 200 civilians and kidnapped dozens of Druze. 

“Attacks, both military and media-driven, against the province of Suwayda and the Druze population have considerably reduced the differences that existed between the various armed and political Druze groups,” Joseph Daher, a Syrian-Swiss academic, noted. “Faced with these mortal threats, perceived as an offensive against the Druze population as a whole, the need for unity is felt on all sides of the Druze social and political actors.” 

Today, Mazhar, al-Qontar and Ezzedin find themselves aligned with their peers who doubted the government from day one.

Ezzedin said she regrets believing the state narrative of the coastal massacres during which more than 1,400 people, including hundreds of mostly Alawite civilians, were killed. Like in Suwayda, Damascus admitted violations took place but said they were committed by forces outside its control. After the events in Suwayda, Ezzedin now believes “the government is actually controlling and knows about every plan of the factions.”

An independent investigative committee formed following the killings on the coast in March released its findings on July 22. It confirmed widespread violations against civilians, including sectarian killings, that “while widespread, were not organized.” In a press conference in Damascus, the head of the body said it identified 530 suspects: 298 government-aligned individuals and groups, and 265 individuals affiliated with armed pro-regime forces. 

Mending ties

Al-Qontar and Mazhar believe it is unlikely Damascus will be able to mend the schism with Suwayda after the latest violence. “I don’t think there is trust or the possibility of building civil peace because of the violations that took place,” Mazhar said. “The [point of] no return was imposed on us.”

The only chance of change, Mazhar said, is if Damascus pursues truly inclusive governance. “Maybe with international mediation or the government changing from this arrogance—‘the one who liberates, decides’—[and] if the whole Syrian people works in the government and not just one group.” 

Members of HTS and the al-Sharaa’s relatives have been appointed to key ministries and positions, in what many perceive as a monopolization of power.

“If they change in their beliefs and ideology, maybe there could be bridges of trust and the building of civil peace in the future, but if their arrogance continues, they will lose the remaining Syrian components,” he added, referring to Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities. 

Eddin posited concrete steps must be taken before reconciliation can even be spoken of. First, an investigation must take place into the violations that occurred in Suwayda—as Damascus has announced. Any government committee must collaborate with international organizations, she said, calling for “more transparency about the results of these investigations.” 

“Then we need a real national dialogue for all Syrians,” Eddin said. In recent days, notable Syrian civil society actors have called for a new national dialogue process, one that would last up to a year or more. The first national dialogue conference, held by the government in February, only lasted a day. However, “before a national dialogue, we need to protect civilians, to protect all the sects in Syria,” she added, clarifying “we need those factions to be reformed.” 

However, Refaat Amer, a Syrian academic based in Sweden, went further. “A solution is possible if the government makes a complete break with the takfiri groups and stops saying that they are rogue groups, because these are not isolated incidents but systematic actions,” he argued.

The constitutional declaration could also be revised to add a clause protecting minorities, Eddin added. “I’m sorry to say that,” she said. “We had hoped that we wouldn’t talk about minorities anymore after Assad, but now we do need something to say that minorities are protected.” 

Daher said the government must also engage in “real dialogue with social, armed and political actors in Suwayda, and without imposing its will to obtain concessions,” adding it must “let the population of Suwayda choose their own representative,” just as “it should for the rest of Syria’s provinces.”

Finding any road back requires serious action, and the stakes could not be higher, Ebaa Munzer, a journalist and rights activist residing in France, added. “The future of Suwayda—and perhaps the future of social cohesion in Syria—depends on the state’s ability to demonstrate its genuine commitment to citizenship and justice, not on repeating policies that have deepened divisions and caused people to lose trust in institutions, particularly the army.”

“The recent violations have left a deep rift. Today, we are faced with sectarian rhetoric, incitement, and gratuitous killings, which render any attempt at appeasement futile if it is not supported by significant steps on the part of the state,” she said. 

“There is no way out of this dark tunnel without serious and genuine steps—not just symbolic ones.”