Red lines and death threats: Freedom of expression wanes in Suwayda

PARIS — Barely recovered from five gunshot wounds and a broken leg suffered during an abduction and attempted assassination by Suwayda’s National Guard, Morhaf al-Shaer fled the southern Syrian province last month, making his way on foot through farmland to neighboring Daraa, and from there to Damascus. 

Arriving in the capital in early March, al-Shaer brought with him the story of his experience with freedom of opinion, expression and journalism in Suwayda. After beginning his career as an independent journalist ten years ago under a pseudonym for fear of the former regime’s security services, when Assad fell al-Shaer was also part of a generation of journalists who sought to build a media discourse that, as he put it, “supports state-building and government and community work.”

But the path taken by al-Shaer and his peers quickly collided with a new reality taking shape within the Druze-majority southern province, one shaped by the local de facto authorities and a months-long stalemate with Damascus, particularly in the wake of deadly violence last July. In parallel, the space for free expression in Suwayda has narrowed, becoming a battleground where polarization and incitement intertwine with armed force. 

A piece of this was seen last week in the town of al-Qurayya, where the National Guard—a coalition of local armed factions—reportedly arrested 25 people and referred them for military prosecution. The arrests came after a group read a statement focused on “Syria’s unity” during events commemorating the death of Sultan Pasha al-Atrash, the leader of the Great Syrian Revolt against French colonialism in Syria.

For al-Shaer, the pressure began in early 2025 and gradually escalated from smear campaigns to direct threats, before evolving into physical assaults and attempted abductions. His brother, the activist and poet Anwar Farzat al-Shaer, was assassinated outside his home in mid-December 2025. The perpetrators have not been identified, though accusations have been leveled against the National Guard, of which he was critical.

Roughly three weeks later, al-Shaer was shot and abducted by forces affiliated with the National Guard, who attempted to coerce him into recording forced “confessions,” he told Syria Direct. He was released the following day. 

Accusations of “treason” have been weaponized to deter anyone who strays from the prevailing narrative within the province, which is led by Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri. So, having suffered injury and the loss of his brother, and finding no room to work independently, al-Shaer found himself compelled to leave. 

He is not alone. A number of journalists and activists have been forced to flee Suwayda for Damascus in recent months after facing pressure or death threats. Their stories, like that of the al-Shaer brothers, raise questions about the limits of expression and speech in a changing Suwayda—whether by local journalists or on social media. 

As restrictions on freedom of opinion, expression and the press mount in Suwayda, independent journalists and local institutions are being affected, as is the ability of civilians to openly discuss political, security and service issues that affect their lives.

Death threats

“There is no freedom of expression or of the press in Suwayda. If you dissent from the view of al-Hijri’s militias, or agree with the Damascus authorities, you are threatened with death at any moment.” said Nabil al-Said (a pseudonym), a journalist who moves between the southern province and Damascus. “You can work as a journalist, but only if you tell al-Hijri’s narrative or serve the narrative of his group.”

Al-Said—who requested anonymity for his safety and that of his family in Suwayda—has faced several direct threats, culminating in death threats, as a result of his journalism, appearances on Syrian and Arab television channels and work with international media inside Suwayda during the first months after the fall of Assad.

He linked the beginning of a clampdown on journalists in Suwayda to the broader political and security context, pointing to the first attempt by the new government’s forces to enter the province at the end of 2024, 22 days after the former regime fell. The attempted entry was rejected by al-Hijri and prevented by local military factions. 

After that, “the pressure on us began, intensifying more and more as tensions between the two sides worsened and culminating in al-Hijri’s infamous March 2025 statements, when he said there is no understanding or agreement with this [Islamic State] IS authority in Damascus,” al-Said told Syria Direct. After that, “anyone who talks about building the Syrian state or dialogue with Damascus became an enemy and a target,” he added. 

As a result, al-Said halted his own television appearances and took a hiatus from the media outlet he worked with, before later resuming his work from Damascus under a pseudonym. 

For her part, journalist Sara Hamid (a pseudonym) left Suwayda for Damascus with her husband several months ago, after threats against both of them increased. The couple had worked in the media since 2018, during which time they faced “many security threats, but each time we overcame them and continued our career,” she told Syria Direct. 

But after Assad fell and al-Hijri’s camp became dominant in Suwayda following last July’s violence, “the equation changed, and journalistic work became difficult due to the existence of a political project advanced by external and local actors in the province, which conflicts with our work and independent reporting,” Hamid said. There have also been attempts to “impose a certain narrative on journalists inside the province,” she added, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons. 

“Freedom of expression in Suwayda is no different from how it was during the reign of the criminal Assad regime,” one human rights activist from Suwayda told Syria Direct, requesting anonymity for security reasons. 

This reality “is going from bad to worse” in a number of ways, including “a large number of residents being displaced to neighboring provinces such as Damascus or Daraa, leaving the country or resorting to expressing opinions through anonymous social media accounts,” she added. “This may ultimately lead to total silence due to the stripping of decision-making [power] in the province, and the refusal to accept any dissenting views.” 

The activist, who herself moved from Suwayda to a country in the Gulf months ago, attributed responsibility for “the violations occurring within the province” to “the [National Guard’s] Security Office—the hidden arm of Hikmat al-Hijri, who holds actual power.” 

Created after the National Guard was announced in August 2025, the Security Office in Suwayda was formed out of the local Shield of Monotheism faction, whose members included clerics close to al-Hijri. 

“Any opinion contrary to the approach the province is taking is grounds for an accusation, reaching the point of treason, after which the Security Office moves against the person, subjecting them to repression and using them to intimidate people—as happened with Sheikh Raed al-Matni and Sheikh Maher Falhout,” she added. 

In late November 2025, Suwayda’s National Guard conducted an arrest campaign targeting several figures opposed to al-Hijri, including Druze clerics. 

Videos soon circulated showing Sheikh Raed al-Matni—previously the commander of a local faction and a prominent supporter of Suwayda’s protest movement before the fall of the regime—being humiliated in custody. Two days later, his body was released to his family showing clear signs of torture. 

Sheikh Maher Falhout, detained at the same time, was also reportedly tortured to death. Months earlier, Karam Mundher—a commander associated with pro-Damascus Druze commander Laith al-Balous—was also killed. 

The National Guard denied in a statement last December that the deaths of Falhout and al-Matni were related to their detention, claiming one died from taking a large dose of blood pressure medication and the other from a heart attack. 

Syria Direct reached out to the National Guard for a response to the allegations against it, specifically regarding restrictions on expression and press freedom, but received no response by the time of publication.

A violent turning point

The most significant turning point in Suwayda came in July 2025, when multiple waves of violence—which included identity-based killings committed by government forces, tribal fighters and local Druze factions—left more than 1,700 people dead and 200,000 displaced. Most of those killed were Druze, alongside scores of local Bedouins. 

The bloodshed also impacted press freedoms within the province, as in its wake some journalists working with pro-government Syrian media or Arab and international outlets were forced to stop working in Suwayda, three journalists told Syria Direct. 

Journalist al-Shaer had begun to receive public death threats months earlier, at the start of 2025, from “military factions in Suwayda, Israel supporters, remnants of the former regime and former military security gangs that joined al-Hijri’s militias, who are known to me,” he said. 

In the aftermath of the July violence and subsequent restrictions and threats, “I stopped my journalistic activity, given the emergence of a new political project built on people’s blood. I remained besieged throughout that period as a result of this political alignment,” he added. Still, the situation worsened, culminating in “the assassination of my brother, and my being abducted twice and shot five times.” 

Al-Shaer accused al-Hijri of giving a “green light” to local military factions, and specifically the Security Office, to suppress opposition voices. 

For Hamid, too, the July events marked a dividing line. “Before, we were able to work, and the voice of the state still existed in Suwayda, with government institutions and the governor’s office,” she said. After the violence and the “accompanying sectarian drift within the province, working with any outlet aligned with Damascus became a mortal threat.” 

During the violence itself, Hamid and a press team with her covering the events were detained and directly threatened, she recalled. “Personnel at a checkpoint of al-Hijri’s militias stopped us and pointed weapons in our face while we were covering the bloody events, saying ‘you are traitors and agents of al-Jolani’,” in reference to President Ahmad al-Sharaa, only releasing them after local residents intervened. 

As the death threats increased, Hamid and her husband stopped working as journalists. “You can’t work in Suwayda if you don’t declare your loyalty to al-Hijri,” she asserted. 

During the couple’s hiatus, Hamid received several job offers from well-known Arab media outlets but “refused because of the security situation and death threats,” she said. “My colleagues who work for international news agencies have [also] faced a lot of harassment and death threats. The factions told the family of one of my colleagues: Either you kill your journalist son or we will,” she added. “Many journalists have preferred to flee to Damascus.” 

Before leaving Suwayda, Hamid said she personally witnessed a number of incidents, including journalists being directly threatened, prevented from working or having their equipment broken by local military factions. 

When she decided to flee to Damascus with her husband months ago, Hamid took a bus while her husband left on foot, crossing through farmland to Daraa and from there traveling on to the capital. 

“As a woman, I left in a regular way, but even so I was questioned at a checkpoint of al-Hijri’s militias while leaving: ‘Where are you going? Why are you visiting Damascus?’ I said I was leaving the country,” she said. “It resembled the treatment of the [former regime’s] 4th Division, as though Bashar al-Assad were still present in Suwayda.” 

Commenting on these accounts, one journalist in Suwayda who currently works at a local media organization agreed that “the pivotal transformation in journalism within Suwayda came after the July invasion last year,” as the province was “affected by the extreme polarization, and working objectively became one of the biggest challenges for most journalists.” 

However, the journalist—who asked not to be identified—denied that “the emerging authorities in Suwayda have put controls or laws in place related to the mechanisms of journalistic work.” He told Syria Direct “they have not overtly restricted freedoms, but rather press freedom has been primarily affected by the public mood.” 

Red lines

Three journalists Syria Direct spoke to said there are unofficial red lines for press coverage in Suwayda–namely a ban on criticizing al-Hijri, the factions and corruption. 

“Journalists are prevented from working freely, as the National Guard requires prior approval to photograph any government or service institution, or even shelters, and this interference affects the journalistic content itself,” Hamid said. “While a journalist may speak about people’s suffering at the hands of the authorities in Damascus, al-Hijri, the factions and the corruption, theft and violations they commit cannot be addressed.” 

Hamid claimed “the media portfolio in Suwayda is managed by Salman [al-Hijri], Hikmat al-Hijri’s son, who works to recruit certain figures and influencers,” adding that “any incident, even if it occurs outside Suwayda, is exploited for fabrication and incitement.”

“Freedom of the press and freedom of political, social and developmental work in Suwayda, does not exist” except as suits “the vision of al-Hijri, the National Guard and the so-called Bashan state,” al-Shaer said.

Bashan is the biblical Hebrew term for the area of southern Syria extending from the occupied Golan Heights to Suwayda. In October 2025, al-Hijri referred to Suwayda as “Mount Bashan” in a letter addressed to the United Nations, Arab League and Amnesty International, rather than the commonly used “Jabal al-Arab” or “Jabal al-Druze.” 

“There is no independent press in Suwayda today,” al-Shaer added. “There is a single narrative being told, a narrative backed by Israel and the current of the former regime. It is directed, based on incitement and violates the principles and ethics of journalism.” 

Journalist al-Said, who works for a foreign press organization, pointed to restrictions on “the entry of media institutions, including foreign ones.” He said he has tried more than ten times in recent months to obtain approval for his organization to film in Suwayda, but that all his requests have been rejected by the National Guard. 

“They are afraid Druze citizens will say something that does not match their narrative. They are afraid that somebody will say: yes, we suffered a horrific massacre, but there were mistakes we fell into ourselves,” al-Said said. “There is a broad segment of people in Suwayda who reject al-Hijri.” 

“Al-Hijri wants to promote a single narrative that all the Druze are with Israel, are hostile to the Syrian state, reject the authority [in Damascus] and are against Sunnis and Shiites,” he added. 

Al-Said accused journalists and press institutions currently operating inside Suwayda of “answering to the National Guard, or that these outlets are directly run by individuals within the National Guard—as is the case with one of the most well-known local outlets, which is run by a National Guard commander.” He did not name the outlet he accused. 

Similarly, al-Shaer contended that topics such as “national peace or dialogue are taboo, even if opposed to the authority [in Damascus], provided they support the idea of the state.” Anyone working toward that end “is a traitor in their eyes,” he added, accusing the de facto authorities of “sowing an obsession with calling others traitors, and practicing IS-like extremism.” 

“There are some fellow journalists working at [Suwayda] press outlets who are patriotic youth, children of the revolution, but the will of the National Guard and Salman al-Hijri has been imposed on them and they cannot deviate from this narrative,” al-Shaer added. “Perhaps if they had protection or a safe way out, their position would be completely different.” 

“The press community—overall—has been affected by the state of extreme polarization,” said the anonymous journalist working for an outlet in Suwayda. “There are journalists who lean towards supporting the transitional authorities in Damascus and try to entrench their narrative. On the other hand, there are journalists seeking to promote the narrative of the emerging authorities within Suwayda. We are facing a conflict of narratives that involves journalists from both sides.” 

The journalist said neither he nor his organization have been formally summoned by any entity within the province. Rather, “sometimes we face social pressures, because the majority of the community in Suwayda is still in shock following the July invasion, and harbors intense hostility towards the transitional authorities in Damascus. We navigate this reality with extreme sensitivity.” 

“I think Suwayda is one of the places where even the smallest details are known, despite the sensitive situation, as a result of the extensive and diverse media coverage of its journalists,” he added. “It is natural for any authority to impose restrictions, especially in cases of extreme polarization. Free, independent media pleases nobody—not the authorities in Suwayda, and not the authorities in Damascus.”

“The matter of imposing red lines on coverage is exaggerated,” he added, “nobody has imposed that on us.” While Suwayda’s Supreme Legal Committee “required prior approval for filming in shelter centers, most journalists did not comply with this measure,” he said. 

Social ‘burning’

Prior to the fall of the Assad regime, journalist Hamid was often subjected to smear campaigns and social “burning” by the regime itself and figures affiliated to it, but “didn’t care about such campaigns back then, because the community supported us,” she recalled. Today, “the local community does not protect you if they decide to burn you and accuse you of being from the Damascus government,” she said. 

Character assassination laid the groundwork for “most of the cases of kidnapping and murder that took place in Suwayda,” Hamid added. “Beforehand, they would burn the person by calling them a traitor among people and on social media, so the family would not mobilize to call for them. In some cases, they would not only burn the person, but the entire family.” 

“The policy of social assassination practiced by al-Hijri against anyone who takes a rational position is dangerous,” al-Said echoed. He said al-Hijri has been able to sideline the other two top Druze spiritual authorities—Sheikhs of Reason Yousef Jerboa and Hamoud al-Hanawi—through character assassination because of their positions.

“This policy poses an existential threat to all of Suwayda within Syria’s social fabric. It tries to erase the identity of the Druze as a Muslim sect and remove it from its Islamic, Arab and national roots, in favor of constructing an alien identity and nationalism in the name of the Druze,” he said. This “amounts to a project of displacing the Druze from their regions, and turns the issue into a conflict within the same household,” he added.

Al-Shaer, now in Damascus, believes dissent is more widespread in Suwayda than it appears on the surface. He holds that many residents “know that al-Hijri exploits people’s blood and strips them of their voice, but cannot criticize or object on social media or in the streets, and instead limit such discussions to guesthouses and private gatherings.”

This report was originally published in Arabic and translated into English by Mateo Nelson.