Turkey in Syria: Temporary necessity turned permanent presence?

PARIS — In the new Syria, Ahmad al-Hayes’s star is rising. At the beginning of May, after being promoted to the rank of brigadier general, the once-leader of the Turkish-backed Ahrar al-Sharqiya faction was appointed commander of the new Syrian army’s 86th Division, responsible for sectors in the country’s east.

Al-Hayes, also known as Abu Hatem Shaqra, is among several former commanders of Turkish-backed opposition factions to see their fortunes take a similar turn—receiving high military ranks and senior leadership positions in the ministries of defense and interior.

Before him, Fahim Issa—previously the commander of the Sultan Murad Division, part of the Ankara-backed Syrian National Army (SNA)—was tapped as assistant minister of defense for the northern region in mid-April. He, too, was promoted first, to the rank of a major general in the Syrian army. 

The list goes on. The former leader of the SNA’s Sultan Suleiman Shah Division, Muhammad al-Jassim, also known as Abu Amsha, received the rank of brigadier general and assumed command of the 25th Division in Hama. Doghan Suleiman, former head of the SNA’s Sultan Muhammad al-Fateh Brigade, took command of the 72nd Division in Aleppo as a colonel. Saif Boulad, also known as Saif Abu Bakr, of the SNA’s Hamza Division, became commander of the 76th Division in Aleppo as a brigadier general. All were civilians before the war with the exception of Boulad, who defected from the former regime’s army. 

Most are under international sanctions. Most recently, the European Union imposed sanctions on al-Jassim and Boulad—alongside the Sultan Murad Division, Sultan Suleiman Shah Division and Hamza Division—in late May for involvement in extrajudicial killings on the Syrian coast in early March. Al-Hayes has been under United States (US) sanctions since July 2021, accused of involvement in the 2019 assassination of Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf. 

Such military appointments and commissions are not exclusive to SNA commanders, with many others—including foreign fighters—receiving ranks and leadership positions. However, the elevation of figures affiliated with Ankara in particular raises questions surrounding where the commanders’ allegiances lie: with their country’s new army, or with the country that long supported them. 

It also raises concerns over the scale of Turkish involvement in Syria. Ankara’s footprint in the country has grown significantly since the fall of Assad, through its military presence and the signing of long-term military, defense and economic agreements. 

This report attempts to sketch out the contours of Turkey’s influence in Syria today and what tools it has at its disposal—including the presence of newly minted Syrian officers with loyalties to Turkey. At a time when Damascus is attempting to balance between the various international actors in Syria, does their presence constitute a breach of the security and military apparatus? 

Security breach?

In years past, most SNA commanders have not hesitated to show loyalty to Turkey—raising its flags and meeting with leaders of Turkish nationalist parties—at times at the expense of the revolution they claimed to represent. This loyalty, previously explained by the SNA’s need for funding and weapons in the face of the former Assad regime, now opens a door to security penetration and interference in the new Syrian state.

A photo collage shows SNA commanders Muhammad al-Jassim (Abu Amsha), Saif Boulad (Abu Bakr) and Fahim Issa meeting with figures in the Turkish government and political parties, some of which were taken after the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024. (Web/Syria Direct)

The loyalties of new army commanders to countries that previously supported them financially and militarily pose a major challenge to the new military establishment, one former opposition commander in the northwest told Syria Direct. 

“Cross-border loyalties will stand in the way of building the army and stabilizing Syria. They may serve as a gateway for security breaches in favor of states with agendas in Syria,” the commander said, requesting anonymity for security reasons. Eliminating these loyalties requires “restricting foreign relations—especially with countries that back Syrian factions—to defense ministry leadership, tighter penalties for communicating with external parties and applying military sanctions to violators,” he added.

Newly minted officers from SNA factions are “Turkey’s share,” their appointment “a response to Turkish demands and pressure,” Syrian researcher Manhal Barish told Syria Direct. Ankara “requested that the new Syrian army be made up of 150,000 troops, half of them from the SNA,” he said, but President Ahmad al-Sharaa “did not listen to this demand.” 

For his part, political analyst and defected brigadier general Mustafa al-Farhat held that commissioning officers close to Turkey or other countries is not an extraordinary move. Transnational loyalties “existed in Syria even in the time of Hafez al-Assad. During the Soviet Union period there were officers close to the Soviets,” he explained. “Under Bashar al-Assad, there were officers close to the Russians and Iran.”

This dynamic “happens in many countries,” al-Farhat told Syria Direct. “Turkey was the incubator of the SNA and its leaders, and was their main support.”

The SNA, a collection of several opposition factions in northern Syria, was established in December 2017, three weeks before its forces participated in Turkey’s cross-border Operation Olive Branch against Kurdish forces in Afrin. 

SNA commanders’ ascension within the new military structure may “not conflict with what Syrians want,” for the national army to have “the upper hand” rather than foreigners, al-Farhat added. “These appointments may be more acceptable to them than others.” 

However, the elevation of SNA commanders to leadership positions within the Syrian Ministry of Defense has sparked widespread anger among Syrians, given the involvement of some in violations against civilians. 

Al-Farhat ruled out the possibility that SNA commanders were promoted at Ankara’s behest. The new Syrian administration “wants to appease all parties—the Arab, Turkish and European players—and not appear closed off or extremist. This can explain some of the military appointments,” he said. 

Agreements between Damascus and Ankara “are political matters, and have nothing to do with the appointed officers,” military researcher and defected officer Rashid Hourani echoed. Such promotions “concern the defense minister and army command.”

Commenting on that, a journalist from the northern Aleppo countryside with close ties to SNA commanders said “the Turks instructed the SNA and its security services that they must reach an understanding with the Ministry of Defense and Damascus, and join the new army.”

Meanwhile, “they advised the new government, since the defense ministry was formed, that faction leaders should be given positions leading divisions and brigades, and that the structure of the Syrian army should be based on the foundation of the SNA and its commanders, with deputy ministers of defense [appointed] for each region,” the source added. Damascus “did not follow [all of] this advice,” he told Syria Direct on condition of anonymity for security reasons. 

“The Turks sent a security team from northern Aleppo to Damascus to provide information and consultations regarding the structure of the security apparatus,” he added. The team recommended the new government “take advantage of Syrian Arab expertise in northern Aleppo, and provided a list of defected officers and academics.” This advice, too, Damascus “did not take.”

Ultimately, however, the defense ministry did appoint a number of Ankara-affiliated SNA commanders to top military positions, including assistant minister of defense in the north.

Turkish observation posts

The formal mission of dozens of Turkish observation posts spread across northwestern Syria ended with the fall of the Assad regime last December. Still, Ankara maintains these positions, with some conducting new reconnaissance tasks and limited military movements. 

Ankara first deployed observation posts in Syria in September 2017 along the lines of contact between Syrian opposition factions in Idlib and northern Aleppo and Assad regime forces and affiliates. The monitoring positions were part of a Turkish-Russian-Iranian agreement in Astana, under which Idlib became one of four “deescalation zones” and Turkish forces were deployed as observers. 

The role of the Turkish observation posts was limited to monitoring the ceasefire and recording violations, though they did not play a role in stopping escalation by the regime, or its ally Russia, against opposition areas. 

From an initial 12 observation posts in 2017, dozens were added over the following years. In mid-2024, the Turkey-based Jusoor Center for Studies mapped out a total of 126 Turkish military installations in Syria—mostly in Aleppo—including 12 bases and 114 outposts.

“Ankara has made no changes to the locations of its points, and Turkish soldiers are still present within them,” journalist Mahmoud al-Shamali said from southern Idlib. He did not consider these positions significant, “as they had no role before,” he said.

Researcher Muhammad Adib, who lives in the northern Aleppo countryside, said the observation posts serve a purpose that “has not yet ended.” The positions are part of a broader Turkish military presence in Syria that is “based on two pillars: first, the threats posed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party [PKK] and the Syrian Democratic Forces [SDF], and second the state of instability in Syria,” he said. 

“Changing the political situation does not necessarily mean changing the frameworks and causes that created this Turkish presence in Syria,” Adib added. For Ankara, “the danger remains and stability has not yet arrived, so the presence of these bases and points is justified, to them.” 

The observation posts play different roles today than before the regime fell, when “they monitored the ceasefire and prevented a deterioration in the conflict that could produce new waves of displacement that would impact Turkey” as well as “monitoring SDF forces and controlling their movements,” he said. Now, “their tasks have changed, except for those related to the SDF.” Ankara used its positions in past months to target SDF forces stationed at the Tishreen Dam in eastern Aleppo. 

One of the posts’ new tasks is “to be a center for [Turkish] military forces to be mobilized when needed, instead of mobilizing forces from inside Turkey, especially since the forces at these points are equipped and prepared to intervene in Syria,” Adib said. He expected Turkey to “redistribute its observation points in Syria and turn them into fixed military bases.”

Turkish observation posts have also contributed to “training fighters from opposition factions and supporting them through jamming, surveillance and other operations serving combat activities,” researcher Hourani said. After the regime fell, “they worked to reposition themselves in line with the new realities on the ground.” 

In al-Farhat’s view, the continued presence of Turkish observation posts is in the shared interest of both countries. Ankara “desires regional and international influence,” and its presence could be important to Damascus “in the face of Israeli strikes on Syria.” 

New military bases

At the start of April, Israeli forces launched a fierce air assault on Syrian territory, mainly focused on the Hama and T4 military airports in central Syria and the vicinity of the capital, Damascus. The strikes were largely viewed as a response to Ankara’s intent to establish military bases of its own at the two airports. 

Commenting on the strikes, an unnamed Israeli official told The Jerusalem Post that the strikes were a message to Turkey that “we will not allow you to establish a presence in Syria.” Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz conveyed a warning to the Syrian president at the same time to “not allow hostile forces to enter Syria and jeopardize Israeli security interests, or you will pay a heavy price.”

But Turkey has security considerations of its own in establishing military bases, al-Farhat said. Turkey shares a long border with Syria that is “vulnerable to infiltration,” so Ankara “is allying with the Syrian state to prevent the infiltration of IS or PKK elements into its territory,” he said. 

With the fall of the Assad regime, Turkey also seeks to “fill the vacuum created by the decline of Iranian influence in Syria,” al-Farhat added.

Ankara “played a major role in defeating Bashar al-Assad and getting Iran out of Syria,” researcher Barish echoed. Because Syria is a “big cake, the Turks were assigned the task of filling the vacuum in Syria, given the general distancing and lack of direct involvement by Arab [countries], especially Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Qatar.” 

The presence of Turkish bases in Syria is linked to “understandings with the US,” he added, noting that Washington has not yet allowed the presence of Turkish airbases due to Israel’s refusal. 

Since April, Israeli and Turkish delegations have been meeting in Azerbaijan to negotiate over their respective presences in Syria and create a deconfliction mechanism to prevent any military confrontation in Syria. 

Balancing act

Ankara is attempting to redraw the balance of international actors inside Syria, after “presenting itself to the international community as capable of filling the vacuum in Syria and imposing stability through its military presence while preventing other forces—the Russians and others—from succeeding in any military coup or intervention,” researcher Adib said. 

While the Turks work to reach understandings with the Israelis through negotiations, they are also seeking to conclude military agreements and understandings with Damascus. 

“Turkey will establish new military bases that will define and limit the lines of Israeli intervention,” Adib said. For example, “some forces stationed at one of the Turkish observation points moved towards the Menagh Airbase in northern Aleppo, conducted a reconnaissance operation and placed cement blocks,” in a step that could be a prelude to establishing a new military base.

The role of these Turkish bases is to “support the Syrian forces that are being formed,” Hourani said. He cited statements by Turkey’s defense minister, “who expressed his country’s readiness to arm the Syrian military.” 

Keeping Turkey’s presence in Syria, “within the bounds of an ally, is subject to military agreements that regulate the presence and role assigned to it on Syrian territory, especially since Turkey has successful prior experiences with its military presence in African countries, Qatar and Libya,” where it contributed to arming, training and security, Hourani said. 

“Turkey will work to achieve the required balance in Syria, in cooperation with Syrian leadership,” he added, noting that “Israeli strikes significantly decreased once Turkey brought Azerbaijan into the mediation track with Israel to halt its aggression against Syria.” 

Turkey’s future in Syria

“Turkey will remain a strong ally of the Syrian state for a long time, which may be indefinite,” al-Farhat said, especially since “all our Arab countries have alliances with powerful regional or international states.” 

Researcher Hourani believes Turkey’s military presence in the near future will take the form of three stages, starting with “strengthening and stabilizing the new regime, extending security and supporting Syrian forces.” 

The next stage would consist of “arming and training the army, which helps stabilize the new regime, and solving its problems—especially with Israel—since [Turkey] is a key member of NATO and therefore provides a guarantee of controlling the behavior of the new regime for those who fear it,” he added. The third stage would consist of “monitoring and cooperation.” 

But the future of Turkish-Syrian cooperation could extend farther, he said.“Turkish forces are deployed in 11 countries, whether under the umbrella of the United Nations or through direct bilateral agreements,” and “Syrian forces could participate in these tasks if there is an improvement in their performance and development.” 

This report was originally published in Arabic and translated into English by Mateo Nelson.