Why is Syria seeking rapprochement with Russia despite its unpopularity?

DAMASCUS — In an ornate room in the Kremlin, a meeting unthinkable only a year ago took place last week: Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, the man at the helm of Syria’s post-Assad political transition, shook hands with Russian President Vladimir Putin, whose political and military support for the ousted regime prolonged the 14-year war in Syria and took thousands of lives.

The meeting came on the heels of a high-profile visit by a Russian military delegation to Damascus earlier this month, and ahead of a planned Russian-Arab summit in Moscow. 

In his opening remarks, al-Sharaa said he sought to reestablish diplomatic relations with all countries, “chiefly with Russia,” highlighting the longstanding ties between them. Putin also spoke of history, a “special relationship” built over 80 years. “We have never been guided by any momentary political considerations,” he said. 

For many Syrians, the scene was hard to stomach. Russia’s 2015 military intervention in support of then-president Bashar al-Assad not only helped his regime survive, but ushered in some of the worst violence of the war. 

Over the course of nine years, Moscow conducted indiscriminate airstrikes and targeted civilian infrastructure in Syria, while providing the embattled regime with crucial diplomatic cover at the United Nations Security Council. Over this period, Russia killed more than 7,000 Syrians and committed 363 massacres, according to the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), in addition to more than 1,200 attacks on civilian facilities. 

When opposition forces spearheaded by al-Sharaa’s Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) overthrew the regime last December, Moscow provided Assad and his family with asylum in Russia and facilitated the flight of other top officials. 

This raises the question: Why is Damascus pursuing a rapprochement with Moscow despite its unpopularity, and how might it strike a balance between Syrian public opinion and its strategic interests?

Mutual interests

As opposition forces swept south toward Damascus late last year, taking control of Aleppo city and advancing into Hama, negotiations with the Russians began, al-Sharaa said in an interview with Syrian media last month. “At that time, the Russians made certain commitments to the current Syria, and we also made commitments,” he said.

“When Moscow saw that the regime was doing nothing to halt the advances of opposition forces in December 2024, it stopped its airstrikes—the Russians appear to have agreed for regime soldiers to surrender and go home,” Mahmoud al-Hamza, a specialist in Russian-Syrian relations and founder of the Support Committee for the Syrian Revolution in Russia, a Moscow-based former opposition body, told Syria Direct. 

“Contrary to some expectations, Moscow wasn’t slow to engage with new Syrian authorities but intensified efforts to maintain its military and political presence,” Vladimir Akhmedov, a Russian analyst specializing in the Middle East, said. Putin held several telephone calls with al-Sharaa as early as February, after a high-ranking diplomatic delegation visited Damascus in January.

“The continuity in Russia-Syria relations reflects pragmatic calculations rather than ideological alignment,” Ruslan Trad, a fellow at the Washington-based Atlantic Council, told Syria Direct. “For Damascus, Russia offers immediate practical benefits that Western partners cannot or will not provide under current conditions…as Western aid remains conditional on political reforms and inclusive governance commitments.” 

Read more: Mixed reactions as Syria holds indirect vote for first post-Assad parliament

These benefits could include aid for Syria’s colossal reconstruction and energy needs. Russia supplies Syria with crude oil to fuel its electrical grid, reaching 12 million barrels so far this year. The country is also a key supplier of wheat, with exports to Syria resuming in April. 

“Additionally, Damascus views Moscow as a potential counterweight to Israeli military operations, which have intensified since Assad’s fall,” al-Hamza said. According to the Syrian government, Israel has carried out over 1,000 strikes and 400 ground incursions in Syria, wiping out its military infrastructure and air defense systems, as well as weapons stockpiles. “Damascus is waiting for Moscow to play a positive role with Israel, with whom it has strategic relations,” he added.

Damascus has also historically relied on Moscow for its military apparatus, with nearly 80 percent of its weapons purchases coming from Russia prior to the war. “Russia conducted primary industrialization in Syria and built up its army forces and security services,” Akhmedov said. Arms exports from the Soviet Union to Syria started in 1975, with a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed by the two parties in 1980.

Russia could also play a role in the UNSC to repeal sanctions on key figures in the Syrian government who remain designated as terrorists, including al-Sharaa himself, al-Hamza added. 

For Russia, the benefits of a close relationship with Syria are clear: “Syria was and remains a naval corridor for Russia’s operations in North Africa, namely Libya,” al-Hamza said. Russia also has a presence in sub-Saharan Africa through its mercenary forces. 

Engagement with Syria is also a way for Russia to make its presence felt on the world stage, at a time of reduced influence in the Middle East and international isolation since the start of its war with Ukraine. 

Russia maintains a ground presence in Syria at the port of Tartous and Hmeimim airbase in coastal Latakia province. The fate of these military installations was among the key agenda items for al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow, according to the Kremlin. During his visit to Moscow, al-Sharaa affirmed that all past deals would be respected, suggesting Russia would maintain control of both military bases. 

“There are bilateral relations and shared interests that bind us with Russia, and we respect all agreements made with it,” he said, adding “we are working on redefining the nature of relations with Russia.” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak in turn said Moscow was willing to help Syria with reconstruction. The World Bank estimates that $216 billion is needed for reconstruction.

Trad projected that Damascus will likely allow Russia to maintain a presence in Syria, specifically at Hmeimim, but under “revised conditions, and potentially with reduced scope.” The fate of the bases depends on al-Sharaa’s ability to get buy-in from Western powers—a relationship that remains burdened by sanctions and limited recognition, he explained. “As long as this alignment remains incomplete, Damascus has incentives to maintain a Russian presence as leverage and as insurance against isolation.”

Another key motivation revolves around Russian national security. “Moscow has faced several terrorist attacks from Islamist extremists linked to the Islamic State (IS) and Al Qaeda,” Akhmedov explained. “In view of this, Moscow has expressed high concern about evolving terrorism in Syria and considered counterterrorist action in Syria indispensable to stop jihadist fighters’ flow in the North Caucasus.” 

Western countries share those concerns, and are collaborating with the new authorities, along with the Syrian Democratic Forces, to contain IS, which has seen a resurgence in recent months.

Conditions for re-engagement

Regardless of the realities of realpolitik and the thinking behind rapprochement with Moscow, advocates maintain that the deep and painful history of Russian involvement in Syria requires accountability.

“Russia has committed grave and systematic violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in Syria, amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity,” said Mouhanad Sharabati, a lawyer at the Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression (SCM), which documents violations by all parties of the conflict. “These attacks killed thousands of civilians and destroyed vital healthcare, education, and basic service facilities,” he added. Russian attacks included double-tap strikes, which killed first responders and journalists.

Through litigation efforts, Sharabati’s organization has sought to bring about accountability and justice for victims in recent years. These have included bringing a case against the notorious Russian mercenary company—the Wagner Group—in Russian courts, then with the European Court of Human Rights.

“There can be no talk of a normal relationship with Russia unless it is based on international human rights law, including full recognition of these violations and crimes, a formal apology for them, [and] holding those responsible to account,” foremost the extradition of former president Bashar al-Assad and his brother Maher, Sharabati told Syria Direct. Several high-ranking members of the Assad regime fled to Russia as opposition factions entered Damascus.

“Providing full and effective redress and compensation to the victims, enabling them to exercise their rights to truth and justice, and ensuring non-repetition [of previous violations]” should also be conditions for re-engagement, he added.

“The conditions for engagement should have been [in exchange for] Russian guarantees for reparations for victims and the surrender of stolen assets,” echoed Ahmad Helmi, co-founder and manager of the Ta’afi Initiative, which supports former detainees.

However, avenues for justice remain limited. “Accountability of Russia will be impossible practically, logistically or technically in terms of criminal prosecution, however, Russia must pay the price of its crimes,” Helmi said. He called for Moscow to surrender regime officials on its soil, alongside  assets they stole. The theft of Syrian assets is estimated to be worth billions of dollars.

As early as January, the Syrian government called for Moscow to address “past mistakes” and ensure “justice for the victims” of the war, with reports that it had also demanded reparations. In the wake of al-Sharaa’s visit to Moscow, it also publicly called for the extradition of Bashar al-Assad. 

“Rapprochement is necessary, there is no alternative—Syria is in a weak position and doesn’t have the luxury [not to engage with Russia],” Helmi acknowledged.

“The [Syrian] people’s position differs [from the government], as some condemn the rapprochement—however, those who think more strategically want balance through diversified relations and to reestablish relations between the two countries,” al-Hamzeh echoed.

In the meantime, “al-Sharaa appears to be pursuing a strategy of public accountability coupled with pragmatism,” Trad added.